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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Kori Lynn Ward's 
suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Ward with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 
46-48.) Ward moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an entrance 
into her residence. (R., pp. 74-82.) The district court found that officers went to 
Ward's residence in response to a report that Ward had attempted to kill herself 
by slitting her wrists. (R., p. 116.) They saw a spent shotgun shell in her front 
yard as they approached her house. (ld.) They made contact with Ward at her 
front door, and she appeared "emotionally upset" and "her mannerisms were 
erratic." (Id.) The officers asked Ward to turn down the music playing in her 
residence so they could communicate. (ld.) Ward agreed and went back into 
her residence, but once there Ward pressed a button on the stereo that neither 
stopped the music nor decreased the volume and then started walking down a 
hallway. (R., pp. 116-17.) The officers called after Ward, but she did not return. 
(R., p. 117.) 
Fearing that she would harm herself, officers entered and "escorted her 
back to the living room area." (ld.) "Ward's movements continued to be erratic 
and she seemed intoxicated." (Id.) She "kept mumbling" in an "incoherent" 
manner about "unrecognizable topics," but officers were able to discern 
statements that "nobody cared about her, that she was alone, and that she did 
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not want to be here anymore." (Id.) Officers observed "several scratches" on 
Ward's wrists and "deeper cuts up her forearm that were still bleeding," although 
the injuries did not appear life-threatening. (Id.) Her state of extreme intoxication 
also caused the officer concern that she "may have ingested medication in an 
attempt to commit suicide." (R., pp. 117-18.) 
Officers asked Ward if she had firearms in the house, to which she 
responded affirmatively and indicated a shotgun in a corner of the room where 
she and the officers were located. (R., p. 118.) When reaching for the shotgun, 
an officer saw "an open box where a glass pipe and what appeared to be 
methamphetamine were visible." (R., p. 118.) 
Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter, treated Ward's injuries, and left. 
(Id.) The officers then took Ward "into protective custody and transported her to 
the hospital for evaluation," which evaluation "ultimately resulted in Ward being 
placed on a mental hold." (Id.) 
The district court concluded that the circumstances that might have 
justified entry into the home were "police-created" and therefore not properly 
considered as exigent circumstances. (R., pp. 118-21.) Specifically, officers 
created the need to enter her residence by asking Ward to turn down her stereo 
instead of immediately checking her wrists. (R., pp. 122-25.) Even if the 
entrance was proper, the court concluded, the "search for the gun was beyond 
the scope of the exigent circumstances" because officers could have kept Ward 
from accessing the gun without taking it into their possession. (R., pp. 125-26.) 
The state filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 136-38.) 
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ISSUE 
The district court applied an exigent circumstances analysis at odds with 
precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. Does application of the 




The District Court Erred By Concluding That, Because Alternate Courses Of 
Action VI/ere Available, The Need 10 Assure Ward's Health And Safety Was A 
"Police Created Exigency" 
A. Introduction 
In ruling on the motion, the district court relied heavily on State v. Kelly, 
131 Idaho 774,776,963 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Ct. App. 1998), for the proposition 
that a "police-created exigency" would not justify entry into a house, and that an 
exigency was "police-created" if the police had alternative courses of action. (R., 
p. 120.) Applying this law the court concluded that "the exigent circumstances 
being relied upon to justify the entry are entirely police-created and that creation 
was avoidable by at least one reasonable alternative." (R., p. 122.) The court 
then reasoned that, because it was the police that directed Ward into her home 
to turn down her stereo, the police created the exigency of having to go in after 
her when she did not return. (R., pp. 122-25.) The court held in the alternative 
that even if the entry into the home was not improper the officers conducted an 
unreasonable search for the shotgun. (R., pp. 125-27.) 
The district court erred for two reasons. First, the "police-created 
exigency" doctrine has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Thus, the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. 
Second, it was objectively reasonable to secure the shotgun under the 
circumstances. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion based on an asserted 
Fourth Amendment violation is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 
of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 
148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006); State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, _,288 P.3d 840, 
843 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. The District Court's Application Of The Repudiated "Police-Created 
Exigency" Doctrine Was Reversible Error 
In Kelly a police responded to a call about an arson. 131 Idaho at 775, 
963 P.2d at 1212. When the officer arrived he saw a still-smoldering shed and a 
can of gas that was on fire. He followed footprints in the snow to Kelly's 
residence. He saw Kelly inside dressed in a coat and hat. When the officer 
knocked on the door Kelly retreated, but his wife answered the door. When the 
wife turned from the door and walked into the house the officer followed. 19.:. 
The district court upheld the entry on the basis of exigent circumstances. 
19.:. The appellate court, however, rejected the argument that potential loss of 
evidence or escape of the suspect created exigent circumstances "because any 
exigency that arose here was of [the officer's] own making." 19.:. at 776, 963 P.2d 
at 1213. Because there was no "threat of immediate destruction of evidence or 
flight" until the officer's presence was known, the officer should have "retreated 
undetected" and then "obtained a search warrant without fear that the suspect 
5 
would be prompted to flee or to destroy valuable evidence." 1.9..:. The Court of 
Appeals based its analysis on the rules by other courts that "have held that a 
warrantless entry will not be justified by a police-created exigency, at least where 
the police conduct was unnecessary in view of available alternatives." 1.9..:. 
Applying the holding of Kelly, the district court held that because the police 
played a role, however inadvertent, in Ward's retreat back into her house instead 
of keeping her at the front door, the police created the exigency requiring 
entrance into the house when a different course of action, investigating whether 
Ward was a danger to herself or others at the front door, would not have required 
any entry into the house. (R., pp. 122-25.) Thus, the district court took the 
police-created exigency doctrine of Kelly, in which officers forfeit any exigency 
their presence might create when they approach a home instead of seeking a 
warrant, and expanded it into second-guessing every aspect of a police 
investigation. This expansion would have been unwarranted in its own right; 
however, the district court erred primarily because the police-created exigency 
doctrine applied in Kelly has been specifically repudiated by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. 
In Kentucky v. King, _ U.S. _,131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011), officers, after a 
controlled drug buy in a breezeway of an apartment building, knocked on the 
door of the apartment where they suspected the crack cocaine dealer was and 
announced their presence. They heard sounds they suspected were a prelude to 
the destruction of evidence. Based on this exigency they entered the apartment, 
and saw marijuana and cocaine in plain view. A subsequent search revealed 
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additional evidence. kL. at 1854. The apartment entered was actually next door 
to the dealer from whom the controlled buy was done. kL. at 1854-55. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the denial of suppression, 
concluding that if there was either bad faith by the police in creating the exigency 
or if the exigency was a reasonably foreseeable result of police action, the police 
acted unreasonably under the constitution. 1 kL. at 1855. The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected any existing police-created exigency doctrine and held that 
unless the police created an exigency "by engaging or threatening to engage in 
conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment" there would be no grounds for 
suppression. kL. at 1858. 
After announcing the rule, the Court discussed, and rejected, all of the 
extant "police-created exigency" standards and their justifications employed by 
lower courts. The Court concluded a "bad faith" standard was "fundamentally 
inconsistent" with the Court's rejection of any subjective approach with the Fourth 
Amendment. kL. at 1859. The "reasonable foreseeability" test was inconsistent 
with the Court's jurisprudence rejecting "the notion that police may seize 
evidence without a warrant only when they come across the evidence by 
happenstance." kL. at 1859-60. The Court rejected the "probable cause and time 
to secure a warrant" standard, probably the most similar to the reasoning of 
Kelly. because it "unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement 
strategies" and is inconsistent with the recognition that there are "many entirely 
1 The district court in this case went even further than the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky in King because it was not reasonably foreseeable that asking Ward to 
turn down the music would create exigent circumstances. 
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proper reasons why police may not want to seek a search warrant as soon as the 
bare minimum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is acquired." 19.:. 
at 1860. "We have said that law enforcement officers are under no constitutional 
duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum 
evidence to establish probable cause." 19.:. at 1860-61 (internal quote and 
brackets omitted). Finally, the Court rejected the "standard or good investigative 
tactics" approach, the standard most like that applied by the district court in this 
case, because it "fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement officers and 
authorizes courts to make judgments on matters that are the province of those 
who are responsible for ... state law enforcement agencies." 19.:. at 1861. 
The Court then reiterated its holding: "we conclude that the exigent 
circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by 
means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment." 19.:. at 
1862. It concluded that, under this test, the officers in that case did not gain 
entry by an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation. 19.:. at 1862-64. 
In this case the district court concluded that the officer's "order to go 
further into the house and away from the deputies' immediate area" created the 
need for the officers to go into the house to re-gain control over Ward, and 
therefore the exigency was "police-created." (R., pp. 123-24.) However, 
directing Ward to turn down her stereo to facilitate verbal communication, as was 
done here, is not "an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment." 
King, 131 S.Ct. at 1862. Thus, there were no grounds for suppression. 
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The district court did not apply the standard articulated by the Supreme 
Court.2 Application of the standard as articulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States shows there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Ward's decision 
to not turn down the stereo and return as instructed, but instead to move into the 
house, in turn creating the exigency for the police to enter to prevent her from 
harming herself, was not the result of unconstitutional conduct by the officers. 
The district court's order of suppression on the basis of "police-created exigency" 
must therefore be reversed. 
D. The District Court's Conclusion That Securing The Shotgun Was 
Constitutionally Unreasonable Was Also Error 
The district court concluded that the officers engaged in an inappropriate 
"search for the gun" because such search was "beyond the scope of the exigent 
circumstances" and analogized the officer's actions to an inappropriate Terry 
frisk. (R., pp. 125-27.) The flaw in the court's reasoning is that the facts show 
there was no search for the gun, which was in plain view. Observation of items 
in plain view is not a search. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); 
State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, _,283 P.3d 795, 806 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. 
Linenburger, 151 Idaho 680, 684, 263 P.3d 145, 149 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
2 The district court's analysis that by instructing Ward to turn down the stereo 
officers demonstrated they did not subjectively believe there was an exigency 
(R., pp. 122-23) is also directly contrary to well-established law that the Fourth 
Amendment employs an objective analysis. King, 131 S.Ct. at 1859 ("Our cases 
have repeatedly rejected a subjective approach" (internal quotations omitted». 
Whether the officers subjectively believed there was an exigency is irrelevant 
under the proper legal standard of whether there was objectively an exigency 
justifying the intrusion. 
9 
district court found that, after Ward indicated there was a firearm in the corner, an 
officer "saw the shotgun in the corner." (R., p. 118.) When he moved to retrieve 
the weapon he saw the contraband in question. (Id.; see also Tr., p. 39, L. 8 - p. 
40, L. 23.) Because the district court's findings show there was no search for the 
shotgun because it was in plain view, the district court erred by finding an illegal 
search. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order granting the suppression motion. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2013. 
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